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Abstract 
The definition of concepts is a central problem in commonsense reasoning. Many themes in 
nonmonotonic reasoning concern implicit and explicit definability. Implicit definability in non- 
monotonic logic is always relative to the context-the current theory of the world. We show that 
fixed point equations provide a generalization of explicit definability, which correctly captures the 
relativized context. Theories expressed within this logical framework provide implicit definitions 
of concepts. Moreover, it is possible to derive these fixed points entirely within the logic. @ 1997 
Elsevier Science B.V. 
Kqw~rrds: Commonsense r asoning; Delinabiiity; Fixed points; Logic of provability; Default logic; 
Contextual reasoning; Self-reference 
1. Introduction and motivations 
Concepts play a central role in commonsense reasoning. The classical view consists 
of postulating a definition of a concept, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
in which the properties used as definientes are independent of the definiendum. 
Positivists pointed out that if a concept cannot be defined via necessary and sufficient 
conditions it is not a scientific concept. It turns out, however that there are concepts, 
like game-as noted by Wittgenstein-that do not seem to have a common core which 
could be characterized by a set of necessary conditions (see [IS] for a discussion). 
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On the other hand, concepts involving natural kinds like bird, lemon, etc., possess 
necessary but not sufficient conditions. This point is stressed in prototype theory, where 
Eleanor Rosch is one of the main proponents (see e.g. [ 321). In connection with this 
view on “natural kinds”, Reiter [41] suggests resorting to sufficient conditions postulated 
via some linguistic pattern like “normally”, “ typically”, or “assume by default”, which 
appeals to the context to which the definition is relativized. And, in fact, these linguistic 
patterns mirror the role of defaults; namely, a default theory (lY D) accounts for a set 
of classical necessary conditions W and a set of “sufficient” default conditions D. 
Likewise, in almost all cases reported in the literature (e.g. [22,24,29] ), solving 
a circumscription axiomatization (by finding an equivalent first-order theory) yields 
definitions for the predicate being minimized. The circumscription axiom acts like an 
implicit sufficient condition (just as, for Reiter, the default rules act like sufficient condi- 
tions) whereby the theory is implicitly defining the concept. Solving the circumscription 
amounts to finding an explicit definition for the predicates being minimized. 
The notions of implicit and explicit definition of a predicate, with respect to a theory, 
are formalized in first-order logic through Beth’s definability theorem (see e.g. [ 6]), 
which shows that the two notions are equivalent. Moreover, from an implicit definition 
of a predicate an explicit definition can be found by constructing an interpolant formula. 
An immediate consequence of Beth’s theorem is that implicit definitions in first-order 
logic state the uniqueness of the predicate being defined. Therefore, for example, if 
we state that S t- V’x (RAVEN(X) = BLACK(X)), then the only black things we can 
talk about in S are ravens. Whenever the context changes, for example by adding new 
axioms, then by the monotonicity of first-order logic, one cannot compatibly update the 
definition of the concept. Tarski discusses the connection between the notions concerned 
with definability and those concerned with deduction in (541. 
On the other hand, only “well-behaved” predicates are implicitly definable; in general 
we may lack either sufficient or necessary conditions to define a concept; in such cases 
no explicit definition can be drawn. McCarthy’s circumscription [29] circumvents this 
strong behaviour of definability in first-order logic because the circumscription axiom 
is weaker than implicit definability (see [ 111 for a discussion). As noted above, since 
the explicit definition is achieved by minimization, uniqueness is no longer a strong 
constraint because it is relativized to the theory on which circumscription is applied. In 
other words, there is no total commitment to the given definition. 




The circumscription of ONTABLE in T yields a first-order formula because ONTABLE 
is separable (see [ 21]), that is 
(vxONTABLE(x) = (RED(x) i’X=U) AZ) v 
(vxONTABLE( x)E (FCED(x)VX= b) AZ’) 
(2) 
where Z and Z’ are formulae not containing ONTABLE (see [ 2 1, Theorem 1 ] ) 
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We note that in such a case we do not get an implicit definition of ONTABLE, as 
there are at least two minimal nonisomorphic models for it. Therefore we do not get 
an explicit definition in Beth sense. Despite the lack of a classical explicit definition, 
we have obtained a disju$z~tio~ f two de~nitio~s for the predicate ONTABLE. The 
example clearly shows that circumscription is weaker than Beth’s implicit definability 
and we are no longer committed to uniqueness. A first-order disjunction of definitions 
is a nice generalization of definability, though it does not tell how a single explicit 
definition can be obtained from weak implicit conditions. Lin [23] shows that the 
circumscription of a theory, axiomatizing the effects of indeterminate actions, may 
yield a very large disjunction of successor state axioms. To overcome this problem, 
Lin proposes a transformation that breaks the disjunction and yields different successor 
state axioms. The interesting contribution is that his transfo~ation is perfo~ed by 
introducing a suitable predicate which is used, in a sense, to name the contexts in which 
the different effects of the performed action are realized. 
As another example of how implicit and explicit definability enters into nonmonotonic 
reasoning, observe that an approach to logic programming semantics for the nonmono- 
tonic negation as failure operator is the Clark completion, which treats a logic program 
as a set of necessary conditions and “completes” this program by adding suitable suf- 
ficient conditions yielding explicit definitions for the progr~ predicates. Reiter 1401 
shows how, in some cases, the Clark completion is the result of circumscribing the 
program. 
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that many themes in nonmonotonic reasoning 
concern implicit and explicit definability. In fact there are very good computational 
reasons for wanting explicit definitions, because then we can do efficient theorem proving 
by substitution of the definientes for the definiendum in any theorem to be proved. 
However, while it seems clear how to weaken implicit de~nability in nonmonotoni~ 
reasoning (via defauits or circumscription) so far there is no solution to the problem 
of how to get, in general, an explicit definition from the implicit sufficient conditions 
stated through a nonmonotonic theory. The main contribution of this paper is to show 
one way to solve this problem. 
Returning to the above theory ( 1)) in order to obtain one of the disjuncts disregarding 
the others, we should be able to express that, relative to a context C, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an object to be on the table are that either it is red or it is the 
object a. Analogously there is a context C’ where the object is b. The role played by 
contexts should be the following: each definition in the disjunction should refer to a 
different context. 
To subsume a context of reasoning (or a context of discourse) in a theory axiomatizing 
a certain state of affairs, we need a language that resorts to a kind of self-referential 
ability. That is, we need to formalize, in the language, expressions that can be reasoned 
about in that same language itself. A statement in which the context can be ex~~~~it~~ 
taken into account is a cu~~~~nse~se tate~lent. And, in fact, commonsense reasoning 
naturally relies on a current state of affairs: the minimum resource of information at 
hand. 
This form of relativization to the context is often carried out by binding commonsense 
statements to the belief set of an agent. So the self-referential ability is lifted from the 
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commonsense language to one in which two distinct (or even more) levels of reasoning 
are fo~ulated: the one where the agent draws conclusions from the initial assumptions 
and the one where the conclusions drawn are compared with the context, which, in 
general, is a metalogical structure, i.e., a computational object external to the language 
in which the agent is reasoning. The following definition is, in this sense, paradigmatic: 
r E cn/, (I u (Off f -cd $8 F}) (3) 
which says that if I is a nonmonotonic theory then the nonmonotonic consequences of 
I are obtained by taking the deductive closure-in the logic n-of I, together with all 
the formulae consistent with r, where Oa is, in fact, interpreted as “it is consistent to 
assume a in r”. Although f is a context, in the sense that it is considered to be the 
belief set of an agent, the above expression does not belong to the agent’s language. 
When the above schema is used to characterize default reasoning, we have three levels 
of discourse. One for the default theory, one for the translation of I, in order to be 
compatible with Oa, and, finally one for the equation itself. In this last case the self- 
referential ability is definitely disregarded. Therefore, we cannot consider the above 
equation (3) as a commonsense statement, although it has many advantages like, for 
example, providing an embedding for default reasoning in a wide class of modal logics 
(see [26-28,30,31,45,47]). 
Let us reformulate the strict relation between definability and self-reference. As we 
have argued, classical definability is too strong because it is functional, i.e., it commits to 
uniqueness, and this behaviour is not reasonable in the real world. Weakening implicit 
definability (as nonmonotonic formalisms do) involves, in almost all cases, either a 
disjunction of definitions (in the case of circumscription) or a variety of extensions 
(e.g. in the case of default) which are, in general, infinite objects not characterizable 
through sentences. Each disjunct or extension implicitly refers to a different context. 
Insofar as the context is not made explicit in the language, an agent does not have, in 
general, an appropriate sentence for representing the required necessary and sufficient 
conditions involved in a definition. 
What we need is a sentence whose denotation depends on its context, like the deno- 
tation of the word “here” depends on the place it is uttered [ 5 11. A well-known device 
for naming a context is to treat it as a designator, i.e., a parameter which acquires its 
meaning through a suitable substitution (see [ 501 for a discussion on the role of sub- 
stitution in these cases). For example, to express that a given sentence cy is consistent 
relative to a context C a formula of the form C A (Y may be provided, say rp[ C 1. Since 
C occurs in p[C] as a parameter, a suitable substitution for C has to be found. The 
designator C is, indeed, the very sentence q[C]. Therefore the substitution for C is 
a sentence A, in which C does not occur, such that qf A] E A is true. The sentence 
rp[C] E C is a fixed point equation which gives us explicit definitions for C: they are 
the admissible substitutions A for C in p[C], established by shawing that rpr.41 = A is 
a theorem. 
More precisely, when a context is treated as a parameter in a self-referential language, 
finding a substitution for the context amounts to find an explicit de~nition for it. Such 
an explicit definition exists only if we can prove that there are theorems of the form 
I-(, q[ A] E A, where n is an appropriate logic that will be made precise in the paper. 
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The above considerations imply that an explicit definition of a context requires a 
logic where fixed point theorems of the form F,I p[ A] G A exist for a formula p[ C] in 
which the parameter C is suitably used as a designator. More important, the existence of 
such fixed point theorems must be stated without resorting to the uniqueness of C, that 
is, without relying on an implicit definition of C. This has been, in fact, the main effort 
of this work. The connection between nonmonotonic reasoning and a logic in which 
fixed points are characterizable, namely the modal logic G, has been early investigated 
by [ 81. The modal logic G [ 7,521 is the logic in which the notion of provability in 
Peano Arithmetic is interpreted. For this reason the characterization of fixed points goes 
through implicit definability which, as we discussed above, means that there exists a 
unique solution to the fixed point equation; this commitment to uniqueness brings us back 
to the constraints of first-order logic. The inadequacy of G for interpreting consistency 
and provability in nonmonotonic logic was noticed by Doyle, who also observed that 
both G and G*-axiomatizing the notion of truth in Peano arithmetic-“miss out on 
all conringent statements of provability” [ 91. We discuss this point in Section 4.2. On 
the other hand, Gabbay [ 141 has modeled negation by failure in logic programming by 
means of the provability operator of the modal logic G. 
Let us consider again the previous example and say that T[ C] is a theory in which a 
context C occurs as a parameter, That is, T[C] is a theory in which one can represent, 
e.g., sentences of the form: 
(C --f (vxRED(X) + ONTABLE(x 
or 
(C A ONTABLE(U 
Then, what we want to get from T(C) are the following explicit definitions: 
Al f (b’x ONTABLE = RED(x) V x = a), 
A2 E (tin ONTABLE z RED(X) V x = b). 
Now, such sentences Al and A2 exist if we can say that there is a logic A in which, by 
substituting either Al or 42 for C in T[C], we get the following theorems: 
We ask, furthermore, that if such fixed points are expressible in the logic A then the Ai 
are computable from Z’[ C] itself. 
The problem is to determine the restrictions that has to be imposed so as to avoid 
the obvious paradoxes of a self-referential language. Both in [37,38] and in [34] the 
difficulties of dealing with a first-order self-referential language are thoroughly analyzed. 
In particular Montague points out the problems concerned with substitution; we discuss 
this point in the last section of this paper. 
It is possible to circumvent the difficulties arising from self-reference through a modal 
logic; this was in fact the claim of Montague. We show that there is a suitable modal 
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logic in which fixed points of predicates are definable, so that self-reference can be 
fully managed in the previously described sense. The modal approach to the problem is, 
therefore, just an initial way to inquire into interesting solutions. The main contribution 
of this paper is the introduction of a self-referential language, through modal logic, 
in which commonsense statements are expressible and in which explicit definitions are 
obtainable via fixed point equations. 
More precisely, we show how one can deal with a self-referential language and that 
the context is, indeed, what we have in mind: in the case of a nonmonotonic theory 
which is implicitly defining a concept, the context is its explicit definition and, more 
generally, the context is the minimal set of formulae whose consequences are true in 
the theory. To show this, let us consider a default rule y in defauh logic, let C be a 
parameter denoting the context and consider the following sentences: 
(i) “cy is provable with respect to the context C” is identified with q l(C -+ crf . 
(ii) “p is consistent with respect to the context C” is identified with El 0 (C A /3). 
Observe that we use the modal operator Cl to interpret the notion of provability and 
the composite operator 00 to interpret the notion of consistency. 
There are many Iogics in which consistency and provability are not dual, likewise El 
is not always the dual of &--just consider intuitionistic logic [3]. Here we are man- 
ufacturing the meaning of the notions of consistency and provability in nomnonotonic 
logic. Since these notions are interpreted with respect to a context, they do not enjoy 
duahty as in classical logic. 
We define a sentence E(C) capturing (i) and (ii) and such that there exists a diagonal 
sentence A, not cont~ning C, that explicitly defines C in A, with A the modal logic 
KD42, i.e., the modal logic built from the axiom schemata K, D, 4 and Z, 
tK~4z A 3 E(A). (4) 
The above fixed point equation provides a generalization, which correctly captures 
the relativized context, of explicit definability for theories expressed in this Iogicaf 
framework, where these theories may be used to define concepts. Specifically, when 
we apply this result to default theories we show that, whenever (W; D) is a default 
theory [ 391: 
km42 A = E(A) (51 
iff 
A* provides an extension of the default theory (FV D) 
where * is an effective mapping from the language of A to that of (FY D). 3 
Example 1. Let us consider again the foregoing example, in which the default theory 
(W, D) is used to weakly implicitly define the predicate ONTABLE: 
w = {‘dx RED(x) --f ONTABLE( X) , ONTABLE( a) V ONTABLE( b) ), 
o By adding to KD4Z the modal schema 5, the above result does no longer hold. 
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D= 
: -ONTABLE( : TONTABLE( :ONTABLE(x) -+RED(x) 
ONTABLE ' ONTABLE ' O~TABLE(X)~~D(X) ' 
Now, let (W D) (C) be the selfreferential sentence, obtained from (W, D), by making 
the context C explicit, as a designator. According to the results of this paper, we will 
have the following sentence, along the lines of (i) and (ii) introduced above: 
[OCr\G(tjx RED(X) --+ONTABLE(X) A(oNTABLE(~) V~~TABLE(~))~ i\ 
[o(c --+ ~-)A~~(CA~ONTABLE(U))+[?(C --+ONTABLE(bf)] A 
[n(c -+ T) AOO(CA TONTABLE( -n(c -iONTABLE(a A 
[lJ(C -+ T) A q O(C ~\V~(ONTABLE(X) -+m3~(X)))+ 
q (C --+ (V~~NTABLE(X~ -t~E~(x)ff]]. 
The technical meaning of this self-referential sentence will be made clear in the paper. 
Let us call E(C) the boxed sentence q l(W, D)(C). By suitably treating the parameter C 
it is possible to prove, using the techniques of this paper, that there are two sentences, 
namely 
A, =OEl( ~D{~)~(~NTABLE(~)V~~ABLE(~)) A 
(VX RED(x) -+ONTABLE(x)) A 
and 
(VXONTABLE(X) +mD(x))) A9, 
A2 z 00 (~D(~)A(~NTABLE(u)~~~ABLE(~)~ A 
(vxRED(x) --+ ONTABLE( A 
(VX~NTABLE(X) IRED(. A q’, 
such that 
for i = 1,2 where q and q’ in Al and A2 are the “consistency part” of the context, i.e., 
are of the form Cl 0 a, and are later eliminated by theoremhood, thus delivering Ai free 
from subformulae denoting consistency, and Al and 62 are, respectively, substituted for 
C in E(C). In other words, both A, and A2 are ~uivalent to C, which is obtained from 
the fact that both At and 42 are fixed points of E in the modal logic KD42. 
By mapping the formula Al into the language of (K D) we get 
A; = (ONTABLE A\~x(RED(x) SONTABLE(~ 
which, in its turn, is equivalent to 
(6) 
V~(~NTA~~LE(X) =(m~(x)vx=b)) ARED( (7) 
Therefore we get an explicit definition out of the default theory. Observe that the sentence 
we have obtained through the fixed point is free from disjunctions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give some 
preliminaries on the language. In Section 3 we present the modal logic KD4Z and a 
tableau method to perform proofs. More details can be found in [ 1,2], In Section 4 we 
present the results on definability of fixed points in KD4Z, we discuss self-reference 
and fixed points in modal logic, notably the relation with the provability logic G and 
extensions to quantified modal logic. In Section 5 we prove that Reiter extensions can 
be computed by a self-referential sentence in KD4Z and some examples are provided 
in Section 6. Section 7 closes the presentation with a discussion and comparison with 
modal approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Finally we add an appendix with the 
proofs of the main theorems. Other proofs can be found in [ 1,2]. 
2. Preliminaries 
We deal with propositional modal logic, we shall address the extension to first-order 
logic at the end of Section 4. We refer the reader to [ 171 for the basics of modal 
logic. A propositional modal language L is defined using a set of propositional letters U 
whose elements are denoted p, 4,. . . and a unary operator 17. The well-formed formulae 
of the modal language are given by the rule 
where p ranges over elements of lir, i denotes a contraddiction, T a tautology and 
the usual classical abbreviations for disjunction and implication apply. We use both 
lower-case Greek letters and upper-case Latin letters to denote sentences and reserve the 
last upper-case letters of the Latin alphabet and upper-case Greek letters to denote sets. 
Structures are denoted by Gothic letters. 
In general, if 0 is interpreted in the standard way as “necessity” then the modal 
context is alethic (from the Greek “true”). There are many other interpretations, like 
e~~~~e~~c, where q is interpreted either as “knowledge” or “belief”, or ~e~~~~~~, where 
Cl is interpreted as “always”. Other meanings of El are the dynamic one, that is, “true 
after every execution of an action”, the deontic one, in which 0 means “ought to be” 
and finaliy the default one, where a suitable interpretation of [? is “it is provable”, 
similarly to the logic of arithmetic. This is, indeed, the intended meaning of the modal 
operator in this paper. 
A dual operator of Cl is defined by OA = ~0 -A. 
We first introduce some basic notions on Kripke semantics for modal logic. A Kripke 
frame is a pair 3 = (W, R) where W is a nonempty set and R is a binary relation on 
W. A model is a pair Iu = (5, I), where 5 is a frame, and I is a function assigning a 
subset I(p) of W to each propositional letter p. The function I is called a valuation. 
The notation Q, w /== ‘p is defined inductively: 
U,wj=p iff wEI( 
53, w /== -9 iff not 53, w /= 40, 
U,W+~DA$ iff IU,w~~aandU,w~~, 
U, w t_ q p iff for all u E W, with wRu, Iu, u k qa. 
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If 2l = (K R, I) is a model then U, w k A means that the formula A is true at world 
(point) w in the model 2l; A is true in a model Q (‘u + A) if it is true at all worlds 
in !2l. A modal formula A is valid on a frame 5 if A is true at every world of 5, under 
every valuation. 
Most of the research in commonsense reasoning dealing with knowledge, belief and 
self-reference takes into account normal modal logics (e.g. [ 28,30,36,38,42,_53,55] ) 
A normal modal logic is a collection of well-formed formulae of the modal language C 
that extends propositional logic with the axiom schema 
K: q A/\O(A-+B) +OB 
and it is closed under the rules of: 
Necessitation : A/OA; 
Uniform Substitution : A [p] /A [p/B] , 
where p, A, B E C, p is atomic and B is uniformly substituted for p in A. The resulting 
formula A [p/B] is a substitution instance of A. 
The following list includes some of the better known axiom schemata in modal logic, 
together with their traditional names: 
D: q C,O -+ 09 (seriality ), 
4: •~~00$0 (transitivity), 
T: q +P (reflexivity), 
5: OOp+Op (Euclideanness) , 
B: C)Op+q ( symmetry), 
2-T: q (ap+_t) -(OOp+-tp9) (discreteness), 
L: q (Oq A cp -+ +) V q (Of+G A I++ -+ p) (linearity), 
F: (Oo~~rCI)-fCXrpv0$), 
x: q cllp+nqJ (density), 
w: q (tlcp * cp) --+ clp (finiteness). 
If S,, . . , S,, are schemata then KS, . . . S, is the normal modal logic generated by 
SI , . , S,,. A sentence A is provable in the logic A = KS1 . . . S,,,, denoted F,, A if it has 
a proof from K, S1 , . . , S,,. That is, there is a sequence of formulae Ao, . . . , A,, = A, and 
for each i, i < n, either Ai is a propositional tautology or is an instance of K, S1 , . , S,,,, 
or it has been obtained by Modus Ponens or by Necessitation. The set of theorems of 
n coincides with the set of formulae in n that have a proof from K, Sl, . . . , S,,. 
Let F be a class of frames (or models), a normal modal logic A is sound with respect 
to IF iff for all formulae cp and all Q, U E F, 1~ 40 implies U /= p. If A is sound with 
respect to IF then F is said to be a class of frames (or models) for A. 
A normal modal logic A is complete with respect to F iff for any set of formulae 
r U {p}, if r kp cp then r En ‘p. Hence A is said to be characterized by F. E.g. KD is 
characterized by the class of serial frames, S5 is characterized by the class of universal 
frames, i.e., R = W x W. 
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3. The modal logic KD4Z 
The modal logic we are interested in is KD42, which is the normal modal logic 
extending KD4 (i.e., the normal modal logic with transitivity and seriality) with the 
axiom Z, discreteness: 
z: q (O$C + $0) - (O[L!~ici$9). 
In the sequel we show that KD4Z is indeed a good logic for self-reference in 
commonsense reasoning. We shall illustrate the logic and give both semantics and proof 
theoretic methods. The schema 2 is widely discussed in [ 171, more details can be found 
in [ 1,2]. 
3. i. KD4Z and its semantics 
We now introduce some useful notions. Given a set T of worlds, with U, u E T, if uRv 
and for no t is uRtRv then u is called predecessor of v and v stdccessor of u. Note that 
both a successor or a predecessor of a world may not be unique and a reflexive world 
has no predecessor or successor at all. A world w E T is called a first element in T if it 
has no preceding elements. 
A frame is linear or connected if for all u and v either uRv or vRu; an irreflexive 
frame (i.e., for no 14 is uRu) is weakly discrete if for all worlds u and v, with uRv 
no infinite chains of worlds uRtl Rt2 . . . Rt,R. . . RL’ exist; a frame is universal if for 
all u and u’, z&. We recall from [ZS] that the concatenation RI ~3 Rz of two relations 
Rt & T x T and R2 c S x S is the relation RI U (T x S) U Rz. 
Given two Kripke frames 51 = (T, RI) and $2 = (S, Rz), where T n S = 0, the Kripke 
frame {T u S, RI CQ R2) is called the concatenation of 51 and 52 and is denoted by 
$1 i;,\& (see[28]). 
In a frame (W; R) a cluster is a subset V of W that is maximal with respect to the 
property that for all u and u from V, uRv. We say that a frame has the terminal cluster 
property if it is the concatenation of 31 0 52 where & is a universal frame (compare 
with condition 2 of Definition 9.17 for cluster-closed class of models in [ 281). 
A frame 5 is said to be well-capped or to have thejfinite depth property if no ascending 
chain of worlds ~vt R . . . Rw, Rwn+i . . . exists. A frame 3 is said to be of depth n if no 
(n + 1 )-chain of worlds wr R . . . Rw,Rw,,+l exists. 
The following theorem gives the characterizations of KD42. 
Theorem 2 (see [ I] ) . KD4Z is complete with respect to each of the following: 
l The class 6fiii o~~nite models whose frames are 5 0 V where 5 is tra~siti~~e, 
it-reflexive with a first element and V is a cluster. 
l The class CZJ of models whose frames are 5 0 V where 5 is transitive, irrejexive, 
well-capped and V is a cluster. 
* The class C5 of models whose frames are 5 0 V where 3 is transitive, irrejlexive, 
well-carped, V is ~sorn~r~h~c to (w, <). 
The decidability of KD4Z follows from the above theorem. 
G. Amati et d/Artijicial Intelligence 93 (I 997) 169-199 179 
) 
Fig. I. A KDlZ model 
By adding the linearity axiom L to KD4Z we have that KD4LZ is complete with 
respect to the class B of balloons [ 171, where the frames are the results of the con- 
catenation of finite, linear, irreflexive and with a first element frames with a terminal 
cluster. KD4LZ is also complete with respect to the frame of “integers” (w, <). 
Note that a frame with no ascending chain is not necessarily finite: in fact a world w 
may have an infinite number of successors (or predecessors) wi, i < 6, where 6 is any 
cardinal. The set of all successors of a world is called a pseudo-cluster. 
Fig. 1 gives an intuitive picture of the structure of the frames for KD4Z. 
3.2. Tableaux for KD4Z 
We introduce in the following semantic tableaux for the logic KD4Z, a proof method 
useful when dealing with examples involving some derivation in the logic. 
Semantic tableaux are used as refutation systems. They are built by means of a set of 
rules that preserve satisfiability of sets of formulae. We make use of the signed version 
of modal tableaux given in [ 131. A formula cp is signed if it is presented in the form 
Tp or Fqo, where the prefixes T and F intuitively refer to true and false. 
Each world in a KD4Z model (5, R, I) can “see” a world belonging to the terminal 
cluster V and, as tableaux build a countermodel, we have to be able to end up in the 
cluster, whichever path we are following, after a given number of steps. 
In the following the possible force formulae are signed formulae of the form T 0 Q, 
F 0 p, and the necessity force formulae are signed formulae of the form T q a, F 0 p. 
Modal expansion rules are stated as follows, where set union is briefly denoted by 
the comma, in the obvious sense. 
3.3. Tableau rules 
Let 
r~={FUOpjFOOpE~}U{TO~~jTO~pE~)U 
{Tp,TCIp ITO~E~}U{@,FOP IFOpa-}. 
Let 




The above rules for FO) and TO) are obtained from the axiom Z in the form -10 cy -+ 
0 (El& A -~a) V 7 0 Elcr together with the KD4Z theorem q 0 cy -+ •1 0 ty iz Oa capturing 
both transitivity and seriality. 
If r is a set of signed formulae, a KD4Z tableau for r is a tree whose root is labeled 
by r and every non-root node is obtained from a preceding node in the same branch 
by means of the application of an expansion rule of the logic. A branch B of a tableau 
is closed if both T(o and FC+Y occur in some node of 8, for some signed formula 40, or 
if T_L or FT occurs in f?; otherwise it is called open. A branch B is satisfiable if there 
exist a model and a world w such that w satisfies the conjunction of all the formulae 
occurring in B. A tableau is satisfiable if some branch of the tableau is satisfiable. An 
open branch is satisfiable, a closed branch is unsatisfiable. 
A tableau is closed iff all its branches are closed, i.e., if all its branches are unsat- 
isfiable. A KD4Z tableau refutation of r is a closed KD4Z tableau for r. A tableau 
refutation of Fu, is a tableau proof of C,U. Hence by a KD4Z tableau proof for 9 we 
mean a closed KD4Z tableau whose root node is labeled by Fp. 
Theoorem 3 (Soundness). rf p has a KD4Z tableau proof then rp is valid in all KD4Z 
models. 
Theorem 4 (Completeness). lfq is valid in all the KD4Z models, then cp has a KD4.Z 
tableau proof 
The above theorems have fairly classical proofs along the lines of [ 131; in particular, 
completeness exploits both filtration and the construction of a generated model. For 
details see [ 21. 
4. Self-reference in modal logic 
In the following we give the technical details on the de~nability of fixed points in the 
modal logic KD4Z; we shall discuss this result and compare it with those established in 
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provability logic G in the next section. We shall also address the problem of extensions 
to quantified modal logic. 
4.1. Definability ofjixed points in KD4Z 
A modal sentence with occurrences of a propositional variable p will be denoted by 
B(p) or C(p), while E(p) denotes any modal sentence where all occurrences of the 
propositional variable p are in the scope of some modal operator. E(p) is called a 
boxed sentence. We may use B( DC(p)) instead of E(p) to denote that E(p) is the 
result of uniformly substituting UC(p) for q in B(q). By E(A) we denote the formula 
obtained by uniformly substituting a formula A for p in E(p) . For example if E(p) is 
q (p ---) r) and p denotes the theory q ( LY A p) then the substitution of q ( LY A /I) for p 
in E(p) = q (p + y) gives q (O(crAp) + y). p is, thus, used as a parametric theory, 
i.e., p denotes the theory which, substituted for p in E(p), returns a formula in which 
the theory itself is realised. 
A fixed point A for E(p) in a logic JI is a modal formula A logically equivalent to 
E(A), that is th A = E(A). 
T denotes any tautology. 
We say that 
(i J a set ofjxed points @J explicitly defines a modal predicate E in KD4Z provided 
tKDdZ E(A) =: A iff A E @, (8) 
(ii) E(p) is an implicit consistency predicate provided 
kKD4Z E(P) --+ 0 0 P. (9) 
By suitably modifying some of the proofs reported in [48], we are able to prove that 
any implicit consistency predicate is definable in KD4Z. Furthermore, for a predicate 
of the form IX(p) we are able to characterize, up to logical equivalences, all fixed 
points in KD4Z. 
Theorem 5 (Definability of predicates of the form UC(p) ). Let E(p) = IX(p), with 
E(p) an implicit consistency predicate. Then q C( T) is a jixed point. That is, 
t~~4z IX(T) = q C(OC(T)). 
The above theorem, whose proof is in Appendix A, states the existence of consistent 
solutions. That is, any implicit consistency predicate has a fixed point. The above 
condition (9), is essential to weaken implicit definability. In other words, the effect of 
this condition in the logic KD4Z is to withdraw uniqueness of fixed points (see the 
discussion in the next section). 
Example 6. Let E(p) = UC(p) = q ((0 0 (p A A) + q l(p --f A)) A Op). E(p) is 
an implicit consistency predicate. q lC( T) is q (O 0 A + q A). 
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We now provide a representation theorem for fixed points in the restricted hypothesis 
that E(p) is of the form UC(p). First, the fixed point q iC( T) is the top element in the 
lattice of the fixed points of E(p), while i is the bottom element (being l-~odz i = 
lJOi/\p).Infact: 
Theorem 7 (Existence of the maximum). Every fixed point 7 of UC(p) is of the form 
q lC( T) A rfor some y, that is FKDJZ 7 + q C( T). 
In conclusion. we have: 
Theorem 8 (Characterization of the structure of fixed points). 7 is a fixed point of 
E(p) = UC(p), with E(p) an implicit consistent predicate, if and only if I is logically 
equivalent to a formula of the form UC(T) A 0 0 y. 
The above theorems, whose proofs can be found in Appendix A, show that whenever 
the language is finite then a finite set @ of fixed points, of an implicit consistency pred- 
icate E(p), is generated. Of course @ is finite, up to logical equivalence. Furthermore 
@ is partially ordered by the t~odz relation as follows: 
B < A iff t~o4.z B + A. (10) 
Example 9. Let E(p) = q ( (0 0 (p A A) + q l(p 4 A)) A Op), as in Example 6. 
Then, OEi~A,ClOA,Cl(0~A + q A),I E @. Observe also that q (UOA + CIA) is 
the top element and i is the bottom element, with respect to the ordering induced by 
(10). 
It is also worth noting that elements in @ may be orthogonal that is: k~odz -(Al AA2) 
and Al,Az E @. 
4.2. A discussion on provability, consistency and the logic G 
There is a well-established area of pure logic where modalities have been used 
to interpret the notions of “provable” and “consistent” in PA, the first-order Peano 
arithmetic [4,7,48,52]. Following Giidel’s procedure for numbering theorems of PA, 
a first-order “provability” predicate can be constructed. Once the unary predicate of 
provability is interpreted as a modal operator 0, according to Solovay’s translation, the 
modal counterpart of the Diagonalization lemma holds for a restricted set of modal 
formulae as stated by the following condition: 
p obeys the diagonalization restriction (DR) in E(p) iff p is boxed in E(p). 
Smorynski, in [ 481, postulates the conditions for the existence of fixed points by intro- 
ducing suitable extensions of the basic modal logic K4: 
l DOL is the extension of K4 such that for each formula E(p, 41,. , q,,), p obeys 
DR and a new operator SE( 41, . . . , q,,) is added together with the following axiom 
schema: 
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~E(BI>... ,B,) = E(SE(BI,...,B,),BI,...,B,). (11) 
l DIL is the extension of K4 obtained by adding the following diagonalization rule: 
DiR. 1~1 ((E(P) = P) + A) 
A 
where p obeys DR, it does not occur in A, and [.~]a = q cu A (Y. 
l G is the extension of K4 with the axiom: 
Lob: 0 (Oa + cr) 4 q a. 
On the basis of the above extensions the following holds: 
EDOL A iff tn,L A iff tG A. 
The proof of the above result (see [48] ) amounts to the proof that fixed points are 
implicitly and explicitly definable in G. In fact, denoting H(p) = [s] (E(p) z p), the 
following holds. 
l Implicit definability (ID) ofjxed points in G: 
ID: tG H(p) A H(q) ---t (p = q). 
In addition, from ID, by the Beth theorem and DiR (both holding in G) it follows: 
l Explicit dejinability (ED) ofjixed points in G: there exists a sentence A containing 
all the variables of E(p) other than p and such that: 
tcH(p) -(p-A)> 
tG A = E(A). 
(12) 
The role of implicit definability (ID) is to state uniqueness of fixed points which is 
crucial for the Solovay’s first completeness theorem [ 521, showing that G is the logic of 
provability, i.e., a modal sentence is a theorem of G if all its translations are theorems of 
PA. On the other hand, for this very reason of uniqueness, it is not possible to state, from 
a theory in the logic G, that “a sentence p is consistent”, i.e., Op, because it would lead 
to the inconsistency of G. Therefore, no possible self-reference to the context, required 
to mention consistency, can be carried out in G. Observe that, instead, this is always 
possible in KD4Z. The role played by the implicit consistency predicate is thus clear: 
in fact, for example, the Giidel sentence t,, cp =: ?Pr( [?I), in which E(p) = 7 0 p is 
not definable when A is KD4Z. 
On the other hand the second completeness theorem of Solovay shows that G* is the 
modal logic whose theorems are precisely those modal sentences of which all translations 
are true in the PA standard model, where G* is obtained from G by dropping the 
necessitation rule and adding reflexivity, i.e., q A + A. Therefore OT is a theorem of 
G* while 0 0 T is not [ 7,521. 
The upshot is that in any logic in which PA is expressible the two schemata fi and 
CIA + A are incompatible, which has been in fact investigated by Montague [ 341. These 
results should be compared with the use, in nonmonotonic modal logic, of the schema T 
together with the rule of necessitation. It seems clear that none of these logics obtained 
by these additions can capture self-reference (see Section 7 for a discussion). On the 
other hand, the failure of uniqueness of fixed points in KD4.Z should be interpreted 
as a sign of a more expressive power than G. In fact, consistency can be expressed in 
KD4Z. 
4.3. Self-reference in. quanti$ed modal logic 
A natural question to be answered is whether, by extending the language to a first- 
order one, self-reference is still characterizable in the appropriate way. An answer to 
this question for the quantized modal logic G (QG) has been given by Montagna in 
1331 and by Smorynski in [49]. We shall discuss Smorynski’s results on definabil- 
ity for QG and some of his counterexamples, and give a simple case for quantified 
KD4Z. 
Let us preserve from the propositional calculus a propositional letter, say p, that 
we shall use as a parameter to name contexts, the propositional connectives, the truth 
values (T and I) and the modal operators. The quantified modal language Q,C we are 
concerned with is obtained by adding to the above propositional constructs and symbols 
an infinite set of variables and n-ary predicate symbols, and the quantifiers t’ and 3. Let 
us call QKD4Z (respectively QG) the extension of propositional KD4Z (respectively 
G) with the instances of axioms of the predicate calculus in the above defined language. 
Let us now add to QKD4Z (respectively QG) the Barcan formula: 
B: VJX 0 P(x) + q V’X P(X) 
that is the syntactic counte~art of models with const~t domains. The converse of the 
Barcan formula: 
BC: i7VXP(X) +vx TIP(X) 
is derivable in QG (see [49]) as well as in QKD4Z. 
The difficulty of definability of fixed points in quantified modal logic stems mainly 
from the interplay between variables and modal operators. In the case quantifiers cannot 
be pushed against the ci, notwithst~ding the Barcan formula, there are counterexamples 
to the definability of fixed points. In Smorynski the following counterexample is given, 
among others: 
A(p) = ‘v’.xfU ci P(x) --+ O(p + P(x))). (13) 
Eq. (13) is used by Smorynski, in particular, to show incompleteness for QG with 
respect to arithmetic interpretations. An example can be analogously used in QKD4Z 
to show that if variables are not bound, with the Barcan formula and even with finite 
domains, definability fails. 
We illustrate the claim as follows: 
Example 10. Let A(p) = Op /\b’x(U 0 P(x) -+ (p -+ UP(n) ) ) . Define the terminal 
cluster as /= P(O),P(l),P(2), w2 /= +(O),P(l),P(2), WI l= P(O),+(I), WI + 
P(2), and wo k P(O),P( l),+(2). 





Therefore wa p p where p = V,x( 0 0 P(x) + q P( x) ) and wo k p E I, while in 
wn the following are all satisfied: 
0p~~x(00P(x) -+ (p --op(X))), 
op r\Vx(OUP(n) ---) (i+ UP(X))), 
Vp A’d’x(O 0 P(X) + T). 
Smorynski discusses also the cases which, with the Barcan formula, do not offer 
counterexamples to definability. In particular, interpreting the multimodal logic SR, 
(see [48, Chapter 41) into QG + B it is possible to show that for any propositional 
combination of formulae of the form Qtxt . . . Qkxk 0 B, in which quantifiers are pushed 
against the box, explicit definability can be given. 
Analogously, we show that for some restricted class of formulae of the quantified 
modal language, the first substitution lemma holds (FSL, see Appendix A). Then, since 
the second substitution lemma (SSL, see Appendix A) can be obtained by means of 
pure syntactical manipulations from FSL, for this class of formulae definability can be 
given. 
Let E(p) be a formulaof QKD42, decomposable as E(ClCt(p), . . . ,UCk(p)), with 
p not occurring in E( 91, . . . , qk), E propositional in 41, . . . , qk and each UC,(p) either 
propositional or of the form q (poQt XI, . . , Qkxkp( xt . . . xk) ), with all the occurrences 
of variables in qo(xt . xk) bound, no modal operators occurring in ~(xt . . . xk), and 
0 E {+,A,V}. 
Then: 
(1) ~Q,W4ZO(A=B) ~(O(AoQlx~,...,Qkxk~(x~...~k))) 
= (O(B~QIXI,...,Q~X~~~(XI...X~))) (tautology) 
(2) tQKD4Z fJ(A =B) 4 /I\i<k'Cl(A) E 'C;(B) (( 11, tautology) 
(3) kQKD4Z WA =B) --E(UCl(A),...,OCk(A)) 
rE(OC,(B),...,OCk(B)) ( (2)) propositional substitution) 
(4) kQKD4Z q (A =B) + (E(A) = E(B)) ((3)) 
(5) t--eKD4z q l(A = B) A (A = B) + (E(A) z E(B)) ((4), tautology) 
(6) kQKD4Z [sl (A = B) + (E(A) = E(B)) ((5), tautology) 
Observe that if E(p) is decomposable as above, obviously the Barcan formula is 
useless. Both the Bat-can formula and its converse may be needed just to get the 
decomposition. Therefore Theorem 5, i.e., the definability of predicates of the form 
UC(p), can be analogously given for formulae of QKD4Z in the restricted form 
defined above. 
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Example 11. Consider the following cases: 
l Let E(p) = q (p + ‘v’/x(P(x) + Q(X))) A q (p A P(a) VP(b)); then E(p) = 
E(uC~(p),&(p)), whereE(qt,q2) =qtAqz,nC~(p) =O(P + (vx(P(x) --f 
Q(x)))) and q CZ(P) = •(pAP(a)VP(~)). q Cl(T) = q ~x(f’(x) --j Q(x))), 
q C2(T) = q (P(a) VP(b)) and E(T) = lJ(Yx(P(x) + Q(x))) A q (P(a) V 
P(b)). 
l Let E(p) = VxO(pAP(x)), then, by B and its converse E(p) E q Vx(pAP(x)), 
E(p) = E(OC(p)), where UC(p) = q (p A’v’x P(x)). 
l If E(p) = Vx(Q(x) V q l(p + P(x))), then it has no good decomposition. 
We can observe that the example of the introduction is, in fact, analogous to the first 
case above. 
5. Self-reference in nonmonotonic logic: the case of default logic 
We have shown that fixed points are explicitly definable in KD4Z. In this section 
we show that a default theory yields the definition of a modal predicate that has fixed 
points corresponding to an effective translation of its extensions. 
Let (w D) be a default theory, where W is finitely axiomatizable and D is a finite 
set of default rules each of the form 6 = “$; LY is called the prerequisite, p the 
justification and y the conclusion of the default. We assume the reader familiar with 
Reiter’s default logic, we refer to [39] and to [28] for the basic formalisms and the 
most significant results. Let p be a propositional parameter, denoting the context. We 
define the translation of a default theory into the modal logic KD4Z as follows: 
trs(P)=O(p~a)AOO(PAP)jO(P~y), (14) 
Tr(w,D)(P) = 0 OP A WA A m(p) . 
( &D 1 
(15) 
Observe that Op, under the outermost Cl, commits the contest to be consistent. 
In addition, we define a stability condition St(~o) which singles out the set Jo of 
justifications of the defaults in D maximally consistent with the parameter theory p as: 
Sf(WD) (P) = P 4 q A CpAOP-p~OOP). 
PEJI) 
(16) 
In the following we shall drop the subscript both in Tr(w~)(p) and st(,D)(p) when 
no confusion arises. 
The fixed point equation becomes therefore 
p = (TdP) A St(p) 1 
which is equivalent to 
(p - Tr(p)) A St(p) 
by definition of St(p). 
( 17) 
(18) 
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In the sequel we sometimes identify (Tr( p) ASt( p) ) with E(p) . We call the solutions 
to the fixed point equation ( 18) saturated jixed points. Namely, a saturated fixed point 
7 satisfies: 
1KD4Z (7 EE Tr(7)) AL%(l). (19) 
Since p is not boxed in St(p), the theorems of Section 4 cannot be applied directly 
to E(p). Nevertheless, the fact that the fixed point equation is equivalent to (p z 
Tr(p)) A St(p) allows the computation of fixed points, notwithstanding the fact that 
in the general case a formula may have different decompositions and the computation 
of 7 may be rather complex. The set of saturated fixed points is thus a subset of the 
set of fixed points of Tr. Furthermore, we may use the “guess and check” method for 
computing fixed points (similar to [ 281) : we first look for candidates 7 by exploiting 
Theorem 8 applied to Tr(p) and then check whether ,St( 7) holds. This will be explained 
in more details below. 
Once a theory 7 is uniformly substituted for p in the self-referential sentence p E 
E(p) the first sentence Tr checks whether there exists a succession of defaults whose 
modal translations are closed in 7; the second sentence St checks for the saturation of 
the application of the whole set of defaults D. 
The fixed point equation ( 19) states that the logical content of 7 is exactly circum- 
scribed by the two conditions Tr and St. We can now introduce both a provability and a 
consistency operator for default logic. We define the provability operator PrT (40) for de- 
fault logic as q l( 7 + Up) and the consistency operator Conl( 9) as q ( 7r\ 09). Note 
that a fixed point solution 7 for E(p) is of “necessary force”, that is ~~~~~ 7 -+ [?I, 
then 7 t-~naz PrI(q) if and only if 7 ~K,QJZ 0 0 p. 
In the following 7* denotes the set of modal-free formulae CY such that 7 EKD4Z 
0 0 CY. 
Let Jn be the set of justifications p of the defaults of D. To show that the condition 
St imposes the saturation of the application of the defaults of D, we must prove that, 
for the maximal subset D’ of D whose elements in Jo, are consistent with I*, the 
consistency of the elements in JOT can be derived from 7. This leads to prove: 
Theorem 12. Let 
I-KDJZ (7 = Tr(Kn) (7) ) A St(w,o) (7) 
und 
D’ = consistent with I” 
Then: 
(a) (Reduct of a$xed point) kKD4Z 7 s Tr(wDy(7) A /j\PEJ,l, 0 O(7 A p). 
( b) ( Completeness) I* is a Reiter extension of (w D). 
Theorem 12(a) whose proof is that of Proposition A. 13 in Appendix A, provides a 
method for reducing the search of solutions for fixed point equations to the case where 
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E(p) has the form UC(p). It shows that D’ is the reduct of D with respect to the context 
7” [ 16,281. Theorem 12(b), whose proof is that of Proposition A. 14 in Appendix A, 
shows that D’ consists of those defaults used for constructing the extension 7’. 
As for the other direction of Theorem 12(b), if E is a Reiter extension, then the 
modal formula LIE A 0 0 {/3 1 /? E J D and /3 consistent with E} is a saturated fixed 
point. 
Theorem 12, together with the results presented in the previous sections, tells us how 
to find saturated fixed points. The method consists of the following steps: 
l Substitute T for p in Tr(,,) (p), thus getting Tr(,,) (T). 
l I is a fixed point solution of Tr(w.0) (p). If it is the only solution, then there are 
no consistent extensions. 
l All fixed points of Tr(KD) (p) are obtained as logical conjunctions of Tr(,,) (T) 
with Cl 0 p (possibly obtaining I). 
l Theorem 12 applies to obtain Reiter extensions. Since we are interested in the 
reduction of the fixed points to the modal-free language by means of the operator 
*, it is sufficient to consider only those p which are justifications of defaults 
of (W, D). A consistent saturated fixed point, if any, is obtained from a fixed 
point 7 of Tr(w,D)(p) by putting in logical conjunction Tr(w,~j(T) with a certain 
set of formulae 0 0 /3 (p must be consistent with I*). If it is consistent and 
still equivalent to ‘7, then it corresponds to a consistent Reiter extension via the 
reduction performed by the operator *. 
6. Examples 
We now show some examples to illustrate how to check for fixed points for Reiter 
extensions, along the lines of the given results. Observe that we shall give all the 
paradigmatic examples, so that any other (e.g. the one given in the introduction) can 
be easily reduced to the following ones. 
Example 13. Let us consider the default theory (w D) = (8; ($-, $)}, which has two 
extensions. We have: 
To is 00 a ---f O-y) A [7( 0~ + q 7a) . By assuming the first default con- 
stituting D’ as in Theorem 12, we get a candidate for a saturated fixed point 71, 
q 0 cx A Tr(KD) (T) which is q ( 077 A Va). This is a saturated fixed point since D’ 
satisfies the condition of Theorem 12. Analogously, a second saturated fixed point 72 
is q ( OTT A 0~). The two Reiter extensions E are 7 and 7**, namely the deductive 
closures of my and 1~ respectively. 
Example 14. Let us consider the default theory (K D) = (8; ($)}, which has only 
the trivial extension {T}. We have: 
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fI’r(t~)(T) is OtDa -+ cly). This is the only saturated fixed point up to the reduction 
operator *. Then the only Reiter extension Tr(,n) (T) * is equivalent to T. 
Example 15. The default theory (W = 0, D = { $G}) has no Reiter extension. 
E(T) =KD~Z O(O V /? A LIT -+ Cl+) =KD~Z q KD 0 P + O+) =KD~Z 0 0 -/3 is 
the generating fixed point for E but 
While (W = I, D = { $}) has -L as Reiter extension. 
And, in fact, E(T) =K~4z i is a fixed point of E and also satisfies the stability 
condition: 
Example 16. We now show with a simple example, a computation of a fixed point. 
Let be W = 8 and D = {$j} in (W:D). Then E(p) = q l(Op A (Cl 0 (p A p) --+ 
!=KP - P))). 
7+tn,(T) = (0 0 P -+ W>. 
A = 0 0 /? is such that 
E(A)=E(DOP)=U(OOCI~A(OO(OC~PAP) -+U(ClO/3--+/3))) 
sincein KD~Z,~OCIC~--+OO(CIU~!A~) andl-~ClOa!--+OUathefollowingis 
obtained also by (4): q l(0 Cl p A (0 Cl p - 0(0&I + /?>)) hence, by the schema 2: 
q l(Cl~2 ---f QI) --t (OOa + q ]CX), we get 
Moreover, I-_KDJZ St(%o) ( q Cl ,B) . 
While. if A = 0 •i -P then YKDU St(q~) (0 q -p) ( =KD~~ 0 II + + q l( 0 q -p A 
op- J-) =m4z oo~p-+un+). 
The above examples seem to bring lots of machinery into the computation of Reiter 
extensions. Observe however that these computations can be completely automated, since 
KD4Z is decidable and tableaux for the logic are available. 
7. Discussion on the related literature 
We have argued that much of commonsense reasoning concerns the definition of 
concepts, and that this is, in fact, a central theme in nonmonotonic reasoning. 
Nonmonotonic reasoning provides the sufficient conditions in the definition of con- 
cepts by relativizing it to the context, which accounts for some self-referential statement 
190 G. Anzati et al./Art@cial Intelligenre 93 (1997) 169-199 
such as “It is consistent to assume, in the context p, that (Y is pi,. . , &“. However, 
strong (functional) definability like in G or first-order logic cannot account for the 
above notions. 
This form of relativization to the context is often carried out, in the literature on 
nonmonotonic reasoning, by binding commonsense statements to the belief set of an 
agent. So that the self-referential ability is lifted from the commonsense language to one 
in which two distinct (or even more) levels of reasoning are formulated. 
These approaches are based on two paradigms, which we call the preference paradigm 
and, according to Marek and Truszczynski, the negation as failure to prove paradigm. 
The preference paradigm [ 5, 18,251, defines a preference relation among modal struc- 
tures which are sets of classical interpretations. Preference criteria for default reasoning 
were introduced by Doyle in [IO] and Etherington [ 121. Lin and Shoham [25] use 
a bimodal logic to provide a semantical characterization of default logics by means of 
preferred modal models. 
The fixed point paradigm is based on the following idea: “Find a solution (i.e., a 
hexpansion) to the equation r = Cnn (I U { Oy 1 my $F! T}“, where I is a translation of 
the defaults in the modal logic A. 
In particular the above schema has been introduced by the early work of McDermott 
and Doyle (see [ 30,3 I] ), further developed by Stalnaker in an unpublished manuscript 
of 1980, appeared later in [ 531, with the introduction of the notion of stable set, and 
afterwards expanded by Moore in [35]. The connection with default logic has been 
proposed by the work of Konolige [ 191 and further developed in [27]. 
Marek and Truszczynski [ 26,28,55] have shown that with the negation as failure to 
prove paradigm a family of modal logics can be devised to capture default reasoning. 
In fact, A-expansions with n in this family of modal logics are stable sets of ground 
theories r which turn out to be Reiter extensions. Indeed, Marek, Truszczynski and 
Schwartz have established more general results showing that Doyle and McDermott’s 
fixed point is so powerful to yield infinitely many nonequivalent nonmonotonic modal 
logics, by varying the choice of the underlying monotonic modal logic [45]. Among 
these KD45 , Sw5, S4f, S4.2 and S4.3 have been widely studied and proposed as good 
candidates for representing knowledge and belief. A strong argument in favor of them 
is that they are maximal [43-461 and even the largest in their range [45] (i.e., in the 
class of modal logics which generate the same nonmonotonic modal logic). 
Recently Amati et al. [ 11 introduced boxed nonmonotonic modal logics, that is 
logics enjoying an alternative fixed point construction; for these logics the schema (3) 
is redefined by means of boxed contexts. Boxed expansions are thus generated by a 
set equation which is called boxed jixed point. The underlying idea is to interpret the 
membership relation of a formula to the context I as a nonmonotonic provability 
operator. 
In general, modal logic is used to this purpose, belief and knowledge are treated 
as two modalities, and the agent can also define autoepistemic truths, i.e., sentences 
containing occurrences of K and B that refer to the agent’s knowledge itself. In what 
way K and B should be clearly distinguished is however a controversial matter. 
For example, Schwartz and Truszczynski [ 471 consider the logics of minimal knowl- 
edge of Halpern and Moses [ 181 more suitable for describing knowledge sets of an 
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agent than the autoepistemic logic of Moore or Levesque’s “only knowing” logics [ 201. 
For example, if 0 is a modality standing for either B or K and the agent’s initial 
assumption is I = {Clp -+ p}, then p belongs to the belief set when using Moore’s 
autoepistemic logic [ 351, while Halpern and Moses’ logics reject p as a plausible con- 
clusion, AnaIogously, if the agent’s beiief is just {Elp}, then it is argued that p should be 
a plausible conclusion, but when Cl is used as a belief operator, p may be actually false, 
even though believed. Indeed, an implicit requirement for a knowledge operator K is to 
avoid forming a knowledge set containing p whenever the agent’s belief is {Kp -+ p}, 
since this last axiom schema must in some way be considered tautological. This remark 
yields an apparent paradox if one compares it with the valid reasoning schemata of G, 
in which the modal operator can be regarded as an extremely strong form of the knowl- 
edge operator, to the extent that what is known by the system is effectively provable. 
Contrary to our intuition, from the validity of {Up + p} it follows that p is a theorem 
(by the Lob rule) _ As a consequence, theories containing sentences of the form 10 c;o 
cannot be considered in G, thus denying the possibility of using G as a logical basis 
for any form of negative introspection. This fact is a consequence of the well-known 
result about the incompleteness of first-order logic in the language of arithmetic; prov- 
ability and truth run on two different tracks. This limiting result causes unrecoverable 
drawbacks to the possibility of distinguishing beliefs from knowledge: if the agent’s 
knowledge is intended as a set of true beliefs and a suitable notion of truth can be 
given only at the intentional or “external” level, then the question of which modal logics 
are appropriate to represent knowledge and beliefs may become an eternally arguable 
question. 
Another approach, to maintaining a self-referential ability in the language, is taken by 
quoting sentences referring to themselves in the language. This amounts to dealing with 
some analogue of the Lob derivability conditions like Belt [~j ) A Belt 19 -+ $1) - 
BeZ( [q?]) where Bet is a predicate standing for the modal operator B, and [ai is a suit- 
able quotation of the sentence CY. However, the difficulties caused by unquoting quoted 
statements, through substitutions in first-order logic languages have been investigated by 
Montague in [ 341 who thus argued in favor of modal logic. In contrast to Montague’s 
thesis, Perlis in [ 37,381 argues that modal logics are on no tirmer ground than first-order 
logic when equally endowed with substitutive self-reference. Perlis introduces a suitable 
notion of substitution of a name 1~1 for its expression p in formulae (providing a similar 
expressiveness of the godelian numbering function in the arithmetic language). A func- 
tion symbol sub( IPI, [(zl, [LX]) of substitution is supplied (sub( IPI, [Ql, Icy1 ) = S 
holds if S is the name for the term obtained as the result of naming the substitution in 
P of [Ql for all occurrences of 1~~1). Perlis suggests that for an intelligent reasoner 
such self-referential languages are desirable but, essentially, only limiting results are 
reported. 
In this paper we have shown that in the modal logic KD4Z, we can postulate a weaker 
notion of definability, admitting several fixed points to the self-referential sentence p zz 
E(p), and therefore KD4Z admits a class of modal predicates expressing the provability 
of consistency. Finally we have addressed how to solve the problem of representing self- 
reference as an internal construction, thus giving a solution to the problem of representing 
explicit definability. 
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Appendix A 
A.I. Basic theorems of KD4Z 
The following are useful theorems of K: 
. Kl: q (A + B) + (OA + OB). 
. K2: q AAOB+O(AAB). 
The following are useful theorems and rules of KD4Z: 
Let L be 00 and M be 00. 
. Tl: LLp E Lp (MMp = Mp). 
l T2:ClLp~Lp,OLp~LpandLI3p~Lp. 
. T3: L(Lp -p). 
l T4: MLp + Lp. 
. T5: M(q A Mp) + Mp. 
. Rl: If A is a theorem then LA is a theorem of KD4Z. Lp + p is not a theorem. 
It is easy to show the soundness of the above sentences in KD4Z, hence by the 
completeness theorem they are proved. 
A.2. Self-reference and default logic in KD4Z 
Let [s] be the strong box defined as [s] A = OA A A. 
Proposition A.1 (Formalization lemma (FORL) ) . For any A and B the following are 
equivalent: 
(i) ~KD~Z q A -+ q R 
(ii) tKD&? [s]A + B. 
Proof. One direction follows from transitivity, necessitation and schema K. We give a 
semantic proof for kKD4z q a -+ q p implies ~~~~~ [s] a + p. From t-~~4z & ----f q p 
we have k~~4.z q a A (Y 4 Up, and thus kKD4z [s] a + Op. Suppose that there is a 
model Q and a world w, such that 5% w h [s] a, w + q p and 24 w k p. Consider the 
submodel 21 generated by w. 23 is of the form 5 0 C with 3 well-capped and with a 
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first element. Let 93’ be the model obtained from B by adding a new first world we. 
We have %‘, w /= [s] LY, hence B’, wa k Ua! and thus !B’, wo /== Ofi, thus w /= /3, a 
contradiction. Cl 
Proposition A.2 (First substitution lemma (FSL)). Let E(p) be a boxed formula. 
tKnGz [s](A - B) --+ (E(A) = E(B)). 
Proposition A.3 (Second substitution lemma (SSL)). Let E(p) be a boxed formula. 
tKDeZ Cl(A = B) --+ [?(E(A) = E(B) ). 
The proofs of Propositions A.2 and A.3 can be found in Smorynski [ 481. 




k~4 UC(T) -+ q C(OC(T)). 
tKD4z OI?C(T) --+ (UC(T) E ElC(UC(T))). 
Proof of (1). 
(i) t--1(042 RC(?-) ---f (T z UC(T)) (tautology ) 
(ii) t-~4 q OC(T) + q (T - DC(T)) Wet, f9 
(iii) I--KD~z lXlClC(T) + (UC(T) G q C(OC(T))) 
(iv) t-~4 UC(T) --+ (UC(T) E q C(OC(T))) 
(v) E,Y~ q C(-V -+ fJC(OCU7.J 




(vi) I-KDQ q C(OC(T>) --+ (OOC(T) + IX(T)) (( 3) and tautology) 
(vii) I-KDJZ q C(OC(T)) -3 q (OOC(T) -+ UC(T)) 
(Net, K and Axiom 4) 
(viii) I-KD~Z q C(OC(T>> -+ (OUUC(T) + ElOC(T)) (Axiom Z) 
(ix) ~KD~Z q C(OC(T)) --+ (0 0 C(T) -+ 0 Cl C(T) 1 
(I-~042 V q q lcx =I 0 q a in KD4Z see Section A.1 (T2) ) 
(x) tm42 q CU1 --+ F.71 CT = UC(T)) ((2), Axiom 4) 
(xi) I-KI)~z IX(T) --+ (C(T) z C UC(T)) 
(xii) ~-KDYD$Z q ClC(T) + (UC(T) ~OC(OC(T))) 
(xiii) I-,UMZ OClC(T) + (OC(OC(T)) + q C(T)) 
(tautology, 
(xiv) I--xDK~)~z 0 OC(T) + (OC(UC(T~~ - UC(T)) 
(tautology, 
(FSL) 
(Net and K) 
(12) and (9)) 
(13) and (5)) 
cl 
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Theorem A.5 (Definability of predicates of the form UC(p)). Let E(p) = UC(p), 
with E(p) an implicit cunsistenc~ predicate. Then UC(T) is a fixed point. That is 
t~~4~ UC(T) E q C(OC(T)). 
Proof. 
(i) ~KD~Z DC(p) + 0 Op (hypothesis) 
(ii) ~KD~Z UC(OC(T)) -tCiOClC(T) (Uniform Substitution) 
(iii) ~KD~Z OC(OC(T)) -+OUC(T) 
(~-KL)~z 00 p E 0 Cl Op see Section A.1 (TZ)) 
(iv) i-~~4z UC(T) E UC(OC(T)) (Proposition A.4( I ) and (2) ) 
0 
Proposition A.6. Let E(p) = B(UC(p)) artd suppose t~~4z C(p) -+ Op. Thea: 
tm42 E(B(-V) = E(EtB(T))). 
The proof is as in Smorynski [48], where C(p) is C(B(p)). 
Proposition A.7. Let p be boxed in E(p) and let q be a new variable. Then: 
(1) ~KD42 q p = 4) + (E(P) = E(q) ). 
(2) km42 [~l(-Qp) = P) A [sl (E(q) = d --) (Qp = q) + (P - 9)). 
(3) km42 Csl (E(P) = PI A Is1 (E(g) s+ 9) + f0 0 (P = 4) + (P z 4))s 
Proof. The proofs of ( 1) and (2) are as in Smorynski [48]. 
Proof of (3). 
(i> ›KD~Z [sl (E(p) = p) A Es1 (E(q) = 4) --j O(p s q) --f (p s q)) 
((2)) 
(ii) F-KD~Z U(E(p) = p) A WE(q) = q) --f Il(O(p SE q) --t (p s q)) 
(FORL) 
(iii) b4z WE(p) = p> A WE(q) = q) ----f (0 cl (p G 9) --) q l(p s q)) 
(Z) 
(iv) FKD~Z O(W) = p) A EKE(q) = q) + (0 q (p = q) -+ (p 5 4)) 
((i) and tautology) 
0 
Proposition A.8. I-.QXZ [s](p E UC(p)) -+ (p -+ UC(T)). 
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Proof. 
(i) FKD/IZ 0~ -+ q F = P)) (tautology, Net, K) 
(ii) 1~~4z q (T = p) --t q (C(T) = C(p)) (SSL) 
(iii) t,,4z [7p + q (C(T) = C(p)) ( (i), (ii) and tautology) 
(iv) ~--KD~z [sl(p = q C(p)) + ((p + q p) - (UC(p) + q nC(p))) 
(FSL with E(q) = q -+ q q) 
(v) kKD4Z [Sl(P - UC(P)) + (P + q P) ( (iv), Axiom 4 and tautology) 
(vi) ~KD~z [sl(p = UC(p)) + (P + UC(T) = C(P))) 
( (v), (iii) and tautology) 
(vii) ~KD~z [sl (P = q C(P)) + (P + q C(T)) ( (vi), K and tautology) 
q 
As a consequence of the above proposition, we can establish: 
Theorem A.9 (Existence of the maximum). Every jixed point 7 of UC(p) is of the 
form UC(T) Ayfor some y, that is 7 + UC(T). 
Proposition A.lO. Let 7 be a jixed point cf E(p) = B( UC1 (p), . . . , UC,(p)) and 
~_KD~Z E(p) + 0 Op. Then: 
(I) 7~OO~~i~aJixedpointofE(p); 
(2) 7 A Cl 0 a is a consistent fixed point of E(p) ifs 7 y~~4z 0 0 TX; 
(3) IAOO~isaJixedpointofE(p); 
(4) 7 A 0 0 a is a consistent$xed point of E(p) ifs 7 17’~~4z 0 0 -a 
Proof. Proof of ( 1). 
(i) kKD4Z E(P) --+o OP (hypothesis) 
(ii) t~~4z E( 7) = 7 (hypothesis) 
(iii) t-~~4~tIiOq+ [s](7=;7AOOq) 
(q not occurring in 7; theorem of K4) 
(iv) ~-KD~zOO~+ (E(7) -E(7AOOp)) (FSL) 
(v) ~-KD~Z q OqAE(7) =oOqAEE(7-AnOq) (tautology) 
(vi) ~~~~~OOqr\7rOOqr\E(7~OOq) ( (ii), tautology) 
(vii) E-KD~z EC7 A 0 0 q) -+ Cl 0 (7 A 0 0 q) ( (ii), Uniform Substitution) 
(viii) ~,w4~00(7AOOq) +OOq (see Section A. 1 (T5) ) 
(ix) FKD~Z 0 0 q A 7 G E( 7 A 0 0 q) ( (vi), (viii) and tautology) 
Proof of (2). 7 A 0 0 (Y is a consistent fixed point of E(p) iff y~~4z -( 7 A 0 0 a) 
iff y~~4z 7 --t 0 0 -w iff 7 v~~4z 0 0 ~a. 
Proof of (3) and (4). Since 7 A q Oq is a fixed point then substitute q q for q. From 
~KD4Z~o~q-o~q 
we get that 7 A 0 0 q is a fixed point. 0 
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Proposition A.ll. FKD~Z [J](p H UC(p)) AK(T) 4 (p E q 0~). 
Proof. 
(i> ~KD~Z ISI (P - UC(p)) A UC(T) ---f (0~ -+ P) (Proposition A.8) 
(ii) ~-.KD~z El (P * UC(P)) A UC(T) + (p + Up) (Proposition A.~(v)) 
(iii) ~KD~Z El (P ++ UC(P)) A UC(T) + (P = 0~) ((i) and (ii)) 
(iv) ~KD~z q p --+ 0 q p (D and Axiom 4) 
(v) Em4z El (P ++ UC(P)) A UC(T) + (P + VP) ((ii) and D) 
(vi) FKD~Z [SI(p ++ UC(p)) A UC(T) + (0 UP + 4) 
((i), Net, Axiom 4 and Z) 
(vii) ~KD~Z El (P c-$ UC(p)) A UC(T) + [$I (P = UP) 
( (iii), Net, K and tautology) 
(viii) ~KD~Z [SI(p +-+ UC(p)) AnC(T) + (VP +P) 
((vi), (vii), FSL with Vp --+ p) 
(ix) ~KD~Z [Sl (P * UC(p)) A UC(T) + (P = VP) 
(x) bKD4Z bI(P ‘-+~c(P)) AOC(T) -+ (UP= q vP) 
(xi) kKD4Z [SI(p ++ UC(P)) A UC(T) + tP = 0 0~) 
((v), (viii)) 
(Net, K) 
( (iii) ) 
0 
Theorem A.12 (Characterization of the structure of fixed points). 7 is a fixed point 
of E(p) = IX(p), with E(p) an implicit consistent predicate, if and only if 7 is 
logically equivalent to a formula of the form q C( T) A 0 0 y, Moreover, the set of all 
fixed points is 
{UC(T) A 0 0 y / y any formula}. 
Proof. 
(i) k~D4z UC(T) + (7 E 0 0 I) (Proposition A.1 1 and hypothesis) 
(ii) tKD4z IA q C( T) (Theorem A.9) 
(iii) t‘~D4z ir= UC(T) A007 (tautology) 
Furthermore, by Propositions A.1 1 and A.4 the set @J of all fixed points of UC(p) is 
the set 
{UC(T) A 0 0 y 1 y any formula}. 0 
Proposition A.13. If 7 is a saturatedfied point then 
E,I 7 = Tr(wDt)(7) A A 0 0(7A P) 
PEJr,/ 
where 
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E D ) j3 is consistent with T* . 
Proof. Let D’ be defined as above. When /3 E Jnr, there is a model U of 7 satisfying 
0 0 p (the models of 25 are models of KD4Z). 
Let us first prove t,i 7 --+ /jpEJ,, 00 (7Ap) in the hypothesis that 7 is a saturated 
fixed point. Then the first half of the equivalence follows from Tr(,~,)(l) ~KL)~Z 
Tr(kKDi) (7). Let Zl be a model. Since EKD~Z 7 -+ El7 then, without loss of generality, 
we may suppose that !2 is a model of 7. If U satisfies 0 0 p, with j3 E Jo/ then, by 
hypothesis, we have 2l k S~(KJ,) (I), hence 24 k 0 0 p, that is Q b Cl 0 (7 A /?). 
We may suppose that Iu is a model of 7, with an initial world ~0, that does not satisfy 
0 0 p for some j3 E Jo/, hence U /= 0 q -/3. Let U be the set of interpretations u of 
the universal model corresponding to the stable set of I*. Let us insert U in the frame 
of $21 updating the evaluation of all formulae on U and on the set of worlds preceding 
U in the relation R by forcing. We obtain a new model 5X’. 
!2l’ is such that for all modal-free formulae 9 wg b 0 0 40 if (D is consistent with I*, 
but wg &c 0 0 O/3 (this is obtained by inserting U as a set of siblings of any immediate 
successor of the initial world ~0). By the hypothesis of consistency of fi with I*, 
MQ i=; 0 0 /3. Obviously the worlds which are successive to 2.4 still satisfy the same set 
of formulae satisfied in 2, hence the new model 2 cannot be a model of 7, otherwise 
52’ /== q IOP, by reasoning as in the first part of the proof, but 2l’ + Ocl~p. Furthermore 
7 is equivalent to the boxed formula Tr(,q~) (7) : since for all worlds w successive to 
u, NJ k= 07r\,,, A(O(~~(Y)A\O((IA~)-~O(~-~~))AOW~\W,~~~~U~ 
Tr(wD) (7) hence U /= 7. Then for some world w preceding U, w k 7. Now from 
the fact that 7 is logically equivalent to Tr(,,) (I), T~(w,~) (7) is not satisfied. This 
implies that for some default ( y), with p j j?‘, there is a world w preceding U and 
successive to the first world wg, such that w /== Cl(7 + my’) i\aO(?cAP’) AO(lAyr’) 
that is for some world u successive to w we have u /= 7 + a’ and u /== 7 A 77’ and 
p’ E Jnt. This world u must belong to U. because of the way we have inserted Lf, 
hence U k 7 + (Y’ and u b 7 A 1~’ , and then, from U k 7, we get U + a’ 
and u i_ my’, that is U $“I y’. But from EKDJZ 7 s TrcKD) (7) and ä KDJZ 7 + Cl7 
we have 7 ~,QMZ 0 Cl a’ A 0 0 /3’ + 0 0 y’. Therefore 7 I-, Cla’ A OJ?’ + 07’. 
Since U kss a! and U kss O/l’ hence U kss y’ which implies U b y’: we have a 
contradiction. 
As for the other direction of the equivalence, notice that if j3 is not in D’ then 
7 derives 0 q -/3 hence T~(~Jv) (7) k/i Tr(,,) (7). From the hypothesis we have 
t-,i T~QVD) (7) + 7 hence t-KD4z ApEJ,, 0 0 (7 A P) A Tr(Lv.v;DJ) (71) -+ 7. 0 
Proposition A.14. 11(042 (T s Tr(~,j (7)) A (7 - Stpn) (7) ) only if I* is n 
Reiter e~te~~~on. 
Proof. I* is a Reiter fixed point for the operator r when using ‘T* as a context. In fact, 
by Theorem A.9, 7 implies CIC ( T) , hence q ( cllr A q 0 p + q y) , and by Proposition 
A.13 considering the reduct D’, T* is closed with respect to D. On the other hand it is 
Cn~r ( W) = I*, where Cno, ( W) is the set of all formulae which have a derivation with 
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defaults D’ from the set of axioms W with the context T*. Let us prove it by induction 
on the length of a derivation of a formula in Cno, (W). Assume that aI,. . . , a, is a 
derivation and for all j, j < i, 7 F.KD~Z 0 q cr; : let us prove that 7 t-KD4z 0 0 (Y,+, The 
nontrivial case is when a,i,_l is a consequence y of a default (Q) E D’. By inductive 
hypothesis we have 7 k KD~Z 0 q LY hence, from J-KDQ 7 42;@I(Otl~4D~, 
from Proposition A. 13, we have FKDQ 7 + q Oy), hence y E T*. By [28, Proposition 
3.261 7* is a Reiter extension of (w D) being D’ the reduct of D with respect to I* 
and cn~j(W) = 7*. q 
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